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Note: Regulation of Insider and Tippee Trading
in Minnesota
Insider stock transactions occur when corporate directors,
employees, controlling shareholders, or their tippees buy or sell
stock based on nonpublic, material information.1 Generally an
investor harmed by such a transaction seeks his remedy under
federal securities law.2 However, two recent cases3 suggest that
investors and corporations harmed -by insider transactions may
find an effective alternative remedy under the common law and
Blue Sky statutes of the states. Indeed, the limitations inherent
in federal securities law may compel victims of insider transac-
tions to turn to state courts for relief.4
This Note will discuss the development and limitations of
federal law relating to actions against inside traders. The alter-
natives offered by state common law will then be reviewed with
emphasis on corporate derivative actions. Against this back-
ground, Minnesota common law and the Minnesota Blue Sky
statute' will be examined to determine whether an investor or
corporation can recover from an insider under existing Minnesota
law.
I. FEDERAL LAW
The impact of the stock market collapse of 1929 on the na-
1. For the purposes of this Note, the term "insiders" includes all
persons in control of a corporation-directors, officers, employees, and
those owning more than 10 percent of any class of the corporation's se-
curities. The term "tippees" includes those persons in possession of non-
public, material information received from insiders. See 3 L. Loss, SE-
cUR rIEs REGULATION 1450-56 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; W.
PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION or INsIDER TRADING 15 (Supp. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PAINTER].
2. See generally A. BROMBERG, S~cuRiTIEs LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE
10b-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; Loss, supra note 1;
PAINTER, supra note 1.
3. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974); Dia-
mond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
4. A proposed codification of federal securities law might render
state remedies even more important by further limiting the availability
of federal relief. See ALI FEDERAL SEcuRES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1972, and Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). See also Loss & Blackstone, Codi-
fication of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 Bus. LAW. 381 (1972); Loss,
The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus.
LAw. 27 (1969).
5. MINN. STAT. ch. 80A (Supp. 1973).
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tion's economy resulted in the regulation 6 of public stock offer-
ings under the Securities Act of 19337 and stock exchanges under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8 Decisions interpreting the
1933 and 1934 Acts have resulted in what has been termed a "fed-
eral common law of corporate responsibility"9 limiting abuses in
the securities field. Insider trading, although limited by section
16(b) 10 of the 1934 Act, has largely been regulated by Rule
10b-5" of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Prior
to Rule 10b-5, the federal courts had dealt with insider trading
only within the context of common law fraud,' 2 but since the
promulgation of the Rule, common law fraud has been used only
as a beginning for limiting insider trading. The differences be-
tween common law fraud decisions and regulation under Rule
10b-5 appear from an examination of the early fraud case of
Strong v. Repide,'8 the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Second Circuit 'Court of Appeals de-
cision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,14 and the SEC decision
in Cady, Roberts & Co.15
Strong v. Repide involved an action by a former shareholder
against the majority shareholder of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Company, who was also a director of the corporation and its man-
ager. Repide, the majority shareholder, was negotiating to sell
the only corporate asset, a large tract of land, to the government
of the Philippine Islands. When it became apparent that the land
sale would be very favorable to the corporation, Repide hired
one Kauffman to purchase Strong's shares through a broker, thus
concealing Repide's identity and avoiding any inquiry as to his
interest in purchasing the shares. After the purchase, Repide
announced the completion of the land sale. Upon discovering
the true identity of the purchaser, Strong filed suit for recovery
6. For a history of the developments leading to the regulation, see
W. DouGLAS, DswocRAcy D FAmnAwcs (J. Allen ed. 1940); Hanna & Tur-
lington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21
VA. L. REv. 251 (1935); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 32 McH. L. Rav. 1025, 1033-36 (1934).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
9. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 383, 413 (1964). See also Perlman, Book Review,
58 MADN. L. REv. 705 n.1 (1974).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1970).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
12. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
13. Id.
14. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
15. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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of her shares, alleging fraud on the part of Repide. She prevailed
in the lower court, but the Supreme Court of the Philippines
dismissed the complaint.1 6 On appeal, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Repide's scheme of purchase amounted
to a fraudulent concealment 7 and that, because of his fiduciary
position in negotiating the sale of land, Repide was under a duty
to disclose both his identity and the circumstances of his pur-
chase.18
In so deciding, the Court chose between two competing lines
of cases. The first reflected the assumption that the doctrine
of caveat emptor relieves a corporation and its directors of any
duty of disclosure when trading on inside information. 9  The
second reflected a recognition that although there is no general
duty of disclosure among those trading stock, a corporate director
may neither abuse his fiduciary relationship with the corporation
by using inside information for profit" nor fraudulently conceal
information with the result that others are harmed by the con-
cealment.2 1 The Court preferred the second line of cases, holding
that liability attaches when a fiduciary conceals material infor-
mation in the trading of securities. Although the Court was ap-
plying a Philippine civil law definition of fraud,22 it observed
that the result would be the same at common law.
23
16. Strong v. Repide, 6 Philippine Reports 680 (1906). Since at the
time of the sale the shares had been in the custody of one Jones, an at-
torney whose office was next door to Repide's, Strong had also sought
recovery on the ground that Jones had been without authority to effect
a sale. The Philippine Supreme Court had originally affirmed a judg-
ment for Strong on this ground, but on rehearing it was persuaded that
Jones had indeed been authorized to sell. On both hearings, the court
rejected Strong's effort to recover on the basis of Repide's alleged fraud.
17. By deciding the case on the basis of fraud, the Court avoided
the issue of Jone's authority to sell the shares. See note 16 supra.
18. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
19. Hooker v. Midland Steel, 117 ]M. App. 441 (1904); Board of
Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich.
531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Haarstick v. Fox, 9 Utah 110, 33 P. 251 (1893).
20. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v. Har-
ris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904).
21. Rothmiller v. Stein, 143 N.Y. 581, 38 N.E. 718 (1894).
22. The Court cited the following portion of PnmHipINs CIVIL CoDn
§ 1269:
Fraud] exists where the party who obtains the consent does so
by means of concealing or omitting to state material facts, with
intent to deceive, by reason of which omission or concealment
the other party was induced to give a consent which he would
not have otherwise given.
213 U.S. at 430.
23. "This is the rule at common law also ...." 213 U.S. at 430.
See also Loss, supra note 1, at 1627.
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The Court's recognition of the specific fiduciary duty of in-
siders established an independent basis for proceeding against
such insiders. Where a shareholder is unable to prove the re-
quired elements of fraud, he may still recover against an insider
who has dealt with him without disclosure by showing that the
insider owed him a duty to disclose. This incorporation of fidu-
ciary principles into the securities field supports recovery both
by shareholders and by the corporation against insiders who use
nonpublic information for personal advantage.24
At least one court has read Strong as allowing a director
to purchase corporate shares on the basis of inside information
without full disclosure, so long as no misrepresentation or fraud
occurs.2 5 Such an interpretation of the case limits the impact
of Strong to circumstances in which the complainant can show
"special circumstances," 26 such as a fiduciary's failure to disclose
even his identity when purchasing or selling. This reading, how-
ever, overlooks the most important aspect of Strong: the case
supports the broader principle that a fiduciary owes a duty of
complete disclosure of material information and any attempt to
avoid such disclosure will render him liable.
Strong could also be understood to extend only to directors
or corporate officers and thereby not affect others in possession
of inside information. 27 Such a reading would limit "fiduciary
24. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 65-73 infra.
25. Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935).
26. Id. at 497.
27. Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion in Strong, had
also written the opinion in Rothmiller v. Stein, 143 N.Y. 581, 38 N.E. 718(1894). In that case, before deciding between two purchase offers, a
shareholder asked a director for information about the company. The
director fraudulently withheld information and the shareholder suffered
a loss on the transaction because of the fraud. When the shareholder
sought to recover his loss from the director, the director answered that
even if he had disclosed the pertinent information, the shareholder would
then have been obligated to relay the information to his prospective pur-
chaser and thus relinquish his advantage. But Judge Peckham observed
for the New York court that even if the information had been disclosed
to the shareholder-seller, he would have been under no duty of disclosure
to the third party-purchaser, absent a "special means of acquiring infor-
mation" necessary to bring him within the exception of the normal rule
of caveat emptor.
Read with Rothmiller then, Strong could be held to extend only to
insiders, since Justice Peckham in Rothmiller had emphasized the differ-
ence between insiders dealing with outsiders and two outsiders dealing
with each other. As to the former, insiders would be required to disclose
material information upon request. As to the latter, the doctrine of
caveat emptor would apply, and no duty to disclose would arise unless
either outsider had "special means of acquiring information superior in
[Vol. 59:223
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relation" to those within the corporation and would not extend
it to tippees. This limitation has not been followed, however,
and the common law duty extends at least to those who obtain
information from insiders. 28 By focusing on the fiduciary rela-
tionship between Repide and Strong, the case thus provided a
basis for later actions under the fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5
and for actions for breach of fiduciary duty under common law. 29
Although common law fraud, as enunciated in Strong, has re-
mained intact as one theory of recovery to support Rule 10b-5,
the emphasis on the fiduciary duty owed by Repide to Strong
has provided a rationale for holding that those owed a fiduciary
duty may recover from the fiduciary whenever the latter fails
to disclose information.
The Securities Act of 193330 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193431 were enacted in response to the fraud and market ma-
nipulation which precipitated the stock market collapse of 1929.32
The purpose of the 1933 Act was to ensure adequate disclosure
of information in conjunction with corporate stock offerings. 33
Pursuant to this goal, the Act requires the registration of offered
securities and regulates the contents of offering prospectuses.
By enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress
extended regulation to activities on national securities exchanges.
Although the 1933 Act contains sections relating to the fraudu-
lent sale of securities,34 provisions of the 1934 Act substantially
extend the regulation of insider transactions. Principal among
these provisions are section 16, 35 which prohibits short-swing
trading by corporate officers, directors, and those owning more
than 10 percent of any class of stock; and section 10(b),3 6 which
proscribes the use of manipulative devices in the purchase and
sale of securities.
Pursuant to section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,
which has become the primary tool for prevention of fraud in
the least degree to those of the [eother purchaser]." Id. at 594, 38 N.E.
at 722.
28. See text accompanying notes 74-87 and 140-47 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 65-73 and 122-39 infra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
32. See note 6 supra.
33. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q (1970).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
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securities transactions.37 Rule 10b-5 outlaws the use of "any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud," the making of untrue state-
ments or the failure to disclose a material fact, and the use of
practices which operate as fraud or deceit when buying or selling
securities.3 8 The application of Rule 10b-5 to insider transactions
has resulted in an expanding area of law which is still unsettled.
Litigation has raised questions as to who are proper plaintiffs
and defendants,3 9 what is meant by "fraud,"40 and what types
of remedies are available under the rule.41 Although substantial
conflict persists as to these questions, two cases, SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. 42 and Cady, Roberts & Co.,43 have provided
guidelines for the application of Rule 10b-5 in private suits.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation arose because several di-
rectors, officers, and employees of the corporation purchased
stock following the corporation's valuable mineral discovery in
Canada. A series of test drillings indicated the discovery of large
mineral deposits, but drilling was suspended and secrecy imposed
until land acquisition could be completed. When the drilling re-
sumed, it confirmed the discovery of large deposits. Meanwhile,
however, the corporation issued a press release intended to quell
speculation based on market rumors. A few days later, the ex-
tent of the discovery was publicly announced and the price of
37. See generally BRomERG, supra note 2; Loss, supra note 1; W.
PAIE, FEDmuL REGULATION OF INSiDER TRADING (1968).
38. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any ac4 practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The text of Rule 10b-5 is derived from parts of section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and section 17 of the 1933 Act. See Conference on Codification of
the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967). As the origi-
nal section 17 was limited to illegal sales, the combining of the two sec-
tions gives not only defrauded purchasers but also defrauded sellers the
right to recover.
39. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
40. See Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under
SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1070, 1074 (1965).
41. Marth v. Industrial Incomes, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
42. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
43. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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Texas Gulf Sulphur stock rose significantly. During the period
between the initial discovery of the deposit and the final an-
nouncement, several corporate employees, officers, and directors
had purchased stock or exercised stock options. Another em-
ployee, Darke, had passed along information to outsiders who had
traded because of it. Following an investigation, the SEC
brought suit alleging that the defendants had violated Rule 10b-5
by purchasing stock on the basis of their inside knowledge of
the mineral discovery. The suit sought injunctive relief against
the corporation to prevent further misleading press releases, an
injunction against the individual traders to prevent further Rule
10b-5 violations, and rescission of the stock purchases made by
the individual defendants. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint against all but two of the individual defendants.44  The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to those two,
affirmed the dismissal as to one of the other defendants, 'but re-
versed and remanded as to the other defendants.45
The appellate court disagreed with the lower court's applica-
tion of the law, focusing on the district court's definition and
use of materiality and scienter and defining material facts as
those facts "which affect the probable future of the company and
those [facts] which may affect the desire of investors to buy,
sell, or hold the company's securities."46 Moreover, by defining
material facts in terms of whether the reasonable investor would
attach importance to the facts in making his investment deci-
sion,47 the court reaffirmed the reasonable-investor test it had
previously employed.48 The district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur
had used the standard of a conservative investor rather than a
reasonable one.49 The court of appeals observed that the results
of the drilling would be material facts that the reasonable in-
vestor would deem important.50
44. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
45. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). On remand, after eight years of
litigation, the case was finally closed on November 15, 1973, when Judke
Bonsal signed an order distributing the damages recovered from the de-
fendants. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1973, at 1, col 5.
46. 401 F.2d at 849.
47. Id.
48. "The basic test of 'materiality,' on the other hand, is whether
'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented]
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question."' List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
49. "But the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative
one... ." 258 F. Supp. at 280.
50, 401 F,2d at 84-53,
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The question of scienter or intent to defraud was also present
in the case, as three of the defendants claimed to have purchased
their shares believing the news of the mineral discovery to be
public information. The court ruled against the defendants on
this point, holding that their purchase of shares before the mar-
ket had reacted to the news of the discovery was in violation
of the spirit of Rule 10,b-5. 51 In discussing intent, the court im-
plied that the common law fraud requirements would be relaxed
to include actions that were merely unreasonable or negligent.r,2
One observer, however, has examined scienter under Rule 10b-5
and suggests that although there may be a difference between
the intent requirements of Rule 10b-5 and those of the common
law, courts do require some showing of intent to defraud in Rule
10b-5 suits.53
One of the most important questions involving Rule 10b-5-
that of tippee liability-was present in Texas Gulf Sulphur, but
since the tippees were not defendants, the court did not reach
the question of their liability.54 Prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the SEC had held in Cady, Roberts & Co.55 that Rule 10b-5 ex-
tended beyond immediate corporate insiders to their tippees. In
Cady Roberts, the board of directors of Curtiss-Wright Corpora-
tion voted to reduce the corporation's quarterly dividend. One
of the directors, who was also a broker for Cady Roberts, trans-
mitted this information to another Cady Roberts broker. The
second broker, knowing that the information was not public, sold
shares from his customers' discretionary accounts and executed
a short-sale for his wife's account. The SEC brought a disciplin-
ary proceeding against Cady Roberts and the second broker for
trading on the basis of the inside information. Suspending the
broker for twenty days, the Commission held that even though
he was not an officer, director, or employee of Curtiss-Wright,
51. Id. at 854-56.
52. "This [scienter] requirement, whether it be termed lack of dili-
gence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains
implicit ... ." Id. at 855.
53. Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 1~b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972).
But see Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
54. As Darke's "tippees" are not defendants in this action, we
need not decide whether, if they acted with actual or construc-
tive knowledge that the material information was undisclosed,
their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the conduct
of their inside source, though we note that it certainly could be
equally reprehensible.
401 F.2d at 852-53.
55, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961),
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he was nevertheless a "person" barred by Rule lOb-5 from trad-
ing on the basis of his inside information.56
Since Cady Roberts, tippee liability has been extended to pri-
vate damage actions in several cases. In Ross v. Licht,57 stock
was bought by the corporate president's brother and two others
based on information provided by the president, and the share-
holder who sold the stock was allowed to recover his damages
resulting from the sale. In a later Texas Gulf Sulphur proceed-
ing,58 the employee Darke was found liable as a tipper for the
damages caused by his tippees. Finally, in Investors Manage-
ment Co.,59 the SEC disciplined Merrill Lynch for communicating
inside information, obtained through an underwriting, to an in-
stitutional customer who traded on the basis of the information.
Rule 10b-5 is limited by the holding of Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.,60 which requires that a party bringing an action for
damages under Rule 10b-5 be a defrauded purchaser or seller.61
The Birnbaum court interpreted the phrase in Rule lOb-5, "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," to mean
that a corporation cannot use the Rule to recover for a breach
of fiduciary duty 'by an insider trading in the corporation's stock.
Under Birnbaum, the corporation can only recover under Rule
10b-5 when it has bought or sold its own securities at a time
when insider trading has occurred, with the damages limited by
the amount of stock the corporation itself has bought or sold.62
No right of recovery exists under Rule 10b-5 for the breach of
fiduciary duty, and a corporation harmed by such a breach must
proceed upon a different theory of recovery.
56. Id. at 911-12.
57. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
58. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 94-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
59. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 77,832
(SEC 1970).
60. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 956 (1952).
61. See Case Note, Non-Fiduciary Tippees Held Liable Under State
Common Law for Inside Information Trading Profits: Diamond Cuts
Deeper, 42 FoRn. L. REv. 211, 216 (1973). But see Comment, A New Ex-
ception to the Birnbaum Doctrine, 4 Mmna-mHs L. REV. 176 (1973).
62. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently indicated
that it will no longer recognize Birnbaum as a limitation where a cor-
porate plaintiff claims fraud in another corporation's stock offering.
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
However, this will not affect the viability of Birnbaum in cases involving
insider trading. Cf. R. JENNNGS & H. MAEsi SEcusRrs REGULATION
1181-82 (3d ed. 1972).
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IT. COMMON LAW ACTIONS
The only federal statute directly regulating insider trading
is section 16 of the 1934 Act, which gives a corporation a cause
of action against stockholders owning more than 10 percent of
any class of the corporation's stock, and all directors and officers,
who buy and sell stock of the corporation within a six-month
period. 3 Since the Birnbaum doctrine denies a cause of action
to a corporation under Rule 10b-5 unless the corporation itself
has bought or sold, any recovery by the corporation against insid-
ers, other than under section 16, must be supported 'by state law.
Among the theories which have been advanced as a basis for re-
covery iby corporations harmed by insider trading,6 4 the breach
of fiduciary duty owed to the corporation is preferred. Two re-
cent derivative suits exemplify the use of fiduciary principles to
recover on behalf of corporations against insiders pursuant to
state common law. Diamond v. Oreamuno65 provides a common
law basis for recovery against insiders, and Schein v. Chasen"6
extends that recovery to suits against tippees.
In Diamond, a stockholder brought a derivative action
against two directors of a corporation who had disposed of their
shares prior to an expected decline in their value. The corpora-
tion was engaged in the sale and leaseback of computers, but
it employed another company to do the maintenance. The direc-
tors knew that a large decrease in profits would be reported, be-
cause the corporation had experienced sharp increases in these
maintenance expenses. Prior to announcing the decrease, two
directors of the corporation sold their shares. When the news
was released, the price of a share dropped from $28 to $11. Upon
learning of the situation, Diamond, a stockholder, filed suit on
behalf of the corporation, alleging that by realizing secret profits
the directors had ,breached the fiduciary duty they owed to the
corporation. The shareholder sought recovery of the profits real-
ized by the directors from their early sale of stock.
In affirming the lower court's finding that the complaint was
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). For a description of section 16 and its
operation see W. PAnr=, supra note 37. As the federal government is
primarily interested in protection of the national securities exchanges, it
has not yet regulated the relationship between a corporation and its fidu-
ciaries beyond the regulation provided by section 16.
64. See Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 55.
65. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
66. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grouncls 4ub nm,
Le.ma n Bros, v. Schein, 94 S. Ct, 1741 (1974),
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sufficient to allow recovery,67 the New York Court of Appeals
held that a corporate fiduciary may not appropriate a corporate
asset for his own ,benefit regardless of whether such appropria-
tion harms the corporation.68 Noting that the principal question
in such a case is whether the directors or the corporation have
a higher claim to the asset, the court held that as against a fidu-
ciary abusing his position, the asset should be given to the corpo-
ration.0 9 The court analogized its holding to federal law, finding
that Congress had intended to prevent a similar abuse of fidu-
ciary position when it enacted section 1670 The court thus re-
jected the defendants' argument that congressional legislation
preempted state common-law recovery, and found that there was
nothing in the federal law limiting a state's power to provide
a remedy for wronged corporations.
7 1
The decision has drawn wide comment, with most discussions
citing the case as a basis for corporate recovery from insiders
distinct from section 16 and Rule 10b-5. 72 One commentator sug-
gests that since Diamond provides a remedy against insiders
without the necessity of proving fraud, the case completes the
pattern of regulation begun by prior common law and federal
legislation and thus ensures a direct cause of action by the corpo-
ration for all insider trading.7 3 However, Diamond fails to an-
swer the final question raised by insider transactions-the com-
mon law liability of tippees. The defendants were directors and
thus fell within the class of insiders who owed a fiduciary duty
to the corporation. Since tippees are not fiduciaries in the tra-
67. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300(1968).
68. 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80. How-
ever, the court found that insider trading does harm corporations. Id.
at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
69. Id. at 498-99, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
70. Id. at 500, 248 N.E.2d at 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
71. Id. at 502, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
72. Note, A Comparison of Insider Liability Under Diamond v.
Oreamuno and Federal Securities Law, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 499
(1970); Comment, Insider Trading on Undisclosed Corporate Informa-
tion, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 22 ME. L. REv. 283 (1970); Comment, Direc-
tors Are Accountabe at Common Law to Unharmed Corporation for
Profits Realized Through Use of Inside Information, 45 No=mn DA=x LAw.
314 (1970); Comment, Corporate Director Accountable to Corporation
Under State Law for Profits Realized from Insider Stock Trading With-
out a Showing of Damage to the Corporation, 22 VAm. L. REV. 1412
(1969).
73. Comment, Directors Are Accountable at Common Law to Un-
hdrmed Corporation for Profits Realized Through Use of Inside Informa-
tion, supra note 72.
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ditional sense, tippee liability must be founded upon a different
basis.
The recent case of Schein v. Chasen74 provides a basis for
the liability of a tippee at common law. Stockholders brought
a derivative suit to recover profits of tippees obtained after re-
ceiving nonpublic information of reduced corporate earnings.
The complaint alleged that one month after publicly announcing
expected corporate earnings, Chasen, the president of Lum's, Inc.,
learned that his estimate was too high. He so informed defend-
ant Simon, a stockbroker for Lehman Brothers, who passed the
information to two portfolio managers of mutual funds. The
managers then sold 83,000 shares of Lum's stock 'before the infor-
mation was made public. Schein, the complaining shareholder,
alleged that by using the information of the reduced earnings
as a ,basis for trading in corporate shares, all defendants had
breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation and should be held
accountable to it. Applying state law, the district court dis-
missed the complaint.7 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that all persons who knowingly use or transmit inside informa-
tion when trading in corporate stock are liable to the corporation
if the inside information has been obtained through a common
enterprise to breach a fiduciary duty owed the corporation.7 6
Unable to find a case on point in the state whose law was
controlling,7 7 the court of appeals invoked Diamond to hold that
the defendants would be liable to the corporation. 78 The court
found that the "stretch" of Diamond7 9 reaches tippees, rejecting
the defendants' argument that the scope of fiduciary liability
should be limited to corporate directors, officers, and employees.
74. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub noma.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
75. Gildenhorn v. Lur's Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
76. 478 F.2d at 817.
77. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of ap-
peals on the basis that under the Erie doctrine the case should have been
certified to the Florida Supreme Court. The Court concluded that when
(1) a novel question of law is presented, (2) state law is uncertain on
the question, (3) the judges are "outsiders" to the law of that state
("lacking common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in thejurisdiction"), and (4) the state law is not bound to a certain determina-
tion by federal law, the lower federal courts should certify the question
of law to the proper state court for a determination of state law if the
state procedure permits certification. 94 S. Ct. at 1743-44. The Court,
however, did not address the reasoning of the court of appeals on the
merits of the liability issue.
78. 478 F.2d at 821-23.
79. Id. at 822.
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In arriving at this result, the court relied principally upon the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which provides for liability
where a third party receives and uses confidential information
from an agent in violation of the agent's duty to his principal.80
Under the Restatement, any intentional assistance in the breach
of that duty is sufficient to render the third party liable.81
Although the Schein decision seems to provide alternative
grounds for relief by its reliance upon both agency and fiduciafy
concepts, the court actually based its conclusions on a combina-
tion of the two. Since the relation of a fiduciary to a corpora-
tion is similar to that of an agent to his principal, the court used
the Restatement as authority for third party liability within the
corporate context, holding that a third party becomes liable as
a fiduciary upon the receipt of information from an insider, just
as a third party receiving information from an agent becomes
liable under the Restatement. The court thereby would impose
liability upon all those who participate in a common enterprise,
thus reaching not only the ultimate tippees, but the intermediate
tippees as well.8 2
A dissenting judge criticized the majority for using "tortured
reasoning" in its application of fiduciary principles to facts in
which no joint enterprise was present.8 3 Since the facts revealed
only a "haphazard" scheme and not a common enterprise, the
dissent contended there was not "any coherent legal theory" sup-
porting the result.8 4 Although the dissenting opinion did recog-
nize the authority of both the Restatement and the fiduciary
principles applied in Diamond, it interpreted them as requiring
either a prearranged plan to pass along the information or active
solicitation of information by the third parties.8 5
The Schein dissent itself has been criticized as an improper
interpretation of the law on the ground that the Restatement
requires only knowledge of the breach of duty and receipt and
use of the information.8 6 As the appeal was taken from a dis-
80. A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violatinghis duty to his principal, receives confidential information from
the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it and required to
hold profits received by its use as a constructive trustee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312, comment c (1958).
81. Id. § 312.
82. Case Note, supra note 61.
83. 478 F.2d at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id.
86. 87 HAR. L. Rnv. 675, 680 (1974).
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missal for failure to state a cause of action,8 7 the allegations in
the complaint should have been taken in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and so taken would have met the tests of the
Restatement.
A comparison of state common-law recovery to federal recov-
ery reveals the advantages and disadvantages of each. Strong""
illustrates the advantages of bringing an action of common-law
fraud; such advantages include the clarity of the law of fraud
and its universal recognition. However, the rigorous proof neces-
sary to establish fraud renders this theory generally unattractive.
In contrast, federal securities law retains the advantage of a well-
developed body of cases with which federal judges and the prac-
ticing bar are familiar. It covers a 'broad range of practices and
the private litigant is frequently aided by the SEC's investigative
machinery.8 9 Despite such advantages, the federal remedy is
limited by the scope of practices covered. The federal statutes
do not address the general relationship between the corporation
and its fiduciaries, and the general fraud provisions include limi-
tations such as the buyer-seller requirement enunciated in Birn-
baum.90 A common-law action based on fiduciary princi-
ples appears to eliminate the problems inherent in actions based
on common-law fraud or the federal securities statutes. The bur-
den of proving a breach of a fiduciary duty is less than the bur-
den of proving either common-law fraud or a Rule 10b-5 viola-
tion. Furthermore, recovery would be allowed by and on ,behalf
of those corporations excluded under federal law by the Birn-
baum rule. Nevertheless, only a few decisions have based recov-
ery upon fiduciary principles.91 This may be because the poten-
tial for multiple actions by various plaintiffs under both state
and federal law induces a court to limit a state fiduciary action
in favor of a federal action.92 More importantly, since common
law fiduciary recovery must be based upon the law of a particu-
lar state, that law must provide a basis for recovery similar to
87. Gildenhorn v. Lum's Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
88. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
89. For a description of how the SEC investigates insider trading,
see A. FI.scEra & J. FLOM, TEXAs GULF SULPHUR-INsIDER DlsCLOSURE
PROBLEMS, 41-45 (1968).
90. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
91. Besides Diamond and Schein, only one other decision has al-
lowed recovery. In Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d
5 (1949), a corporate director's executive secretary was found liable for
trading for personal profit on the basis of advance information of corpo-
rate treasury stock purchases. Brophy was cited in both Diamond and
Schein as support for those decisions.
92. See note 148 infra.
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that found in Diamond and Schein, or the state courts must be
willing to follow decisions from other jurisdictions. Where state
courts refuse to allow recovery on fiduciary principles, the corpo-
ration might be left without a remedy.
III. MINNESOTA LAW
In 1909, the Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized a com-
mon-law cause of action for fraud involving a securities transac-
tion. 93 In 1917, the Minnesota Legislature enacted its first stat-
ute regulating securities issues94-an act which followed the na-
tionwide pattern of Blue Sky statutes.9 5 This early act outlawed
the defrauding of investors by the use of manipulative devices;
provisions regulating other aspects of securities transactions have
been aaded since 1917.96 It is within this statutory and common
law context that the question arises whether insiders and tippees
may be held liable under Minnesota law for trading on the basis
of inside information.
A. STATUTORY LAW
In 1973, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a new Blue Sky
law to regulate securities.97 The new law is patterned after the
Uniform Securities Act and is intended to replace the piecemeal
collection of prior regulation. The new Blue Sky law also con-
tains broad provisions for private recovery and new antifraud
provisions relating to insiders. There are three sections which
specifically regulate actions against insiders: section 1,99 which
has 'been called a "little rule 10b-5";100 section 2,101 which regu-
lates investment advisory activities; and section 3,102 which pro-
hibits trading in a stock for the purpose of creating a misleading
93. Shaw v. Straight, 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909).
94. Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 429.
95. For a history of Mnnesota securities regulation and a criticism
of the old statutes, see Perlman, A Critical Analysis of the Registration
Provisions of the Minnesota Securities Act, 56 MnuIN. L. REV. 523 (1972).
96. Id.
97. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 451, replacing Mnmi. STAT. ch. 80 (1971)(codified at Mnix. STAT. ch. 80A (Supp. 1973)). For a general descrip-
tion of the new statutes, see Lewis, A New and Comprehensive Form ofSecurities Regulation in Minnesota, 42 H Inmmu LAW. 10 (Nov.-Dec.,
1973).
98. Lewis, supra note 97, at 10.
99. M mi. STAT. § 80A.01 (Supp. 1973).
100. Lewis, supra note 97, at 10.
101. 1mN. STAT. § 80A.02 (Supp. 1973),
102, Id, § 80A,03,
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appearance of active trading, manipulating the price of a security,
or inducing purchase or sale.
Section 1 follows the text of Rule 10b-5 with two minor
changes. 0 3 First, since Minnesota does not base its legislation
on a power to regulate interstate commerce as does Congress,104
the opening sentence of section 1 differs from that of Rule 10b-5.
Second, section 1 includes a specific prohibition of fraud in "the
offer... of any security," whereas Rule 10b-5 specifies only pur-
chases and sales-a change which adopted the judicial interpre-
tation of Rule 10b-5 to include "offer."'0 5  Since the Minnesota
Legislature enacted the language of Rule 10b-5 without major
changes, and since the Act is to be construed to encourage uni-
formity among the states and coordination with federal securities
law,1 6 the legislature apparently intended to place section 1
within the same regulatory and judicial framework already con-
structed around Rule 10b-5.
A significant difference between the operation of section 1
and that of Rule 10b-5 stems from section 23107 of the new Act.
103. It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer,
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.
Id. § 80A.01. For the text of Rule 10b-5 see note 38 supra.
104. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9. For a discussion of the relation of statejurisdiction in the securities field to federal jurisdiction pursuant to the
Commerce Clause see Brune, Rule 10b-5 and the General Law as to De-
ceit in Securities Transactions in Maryland, 33 MD. L. REv. 129, 141
(1973).
105. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
106. Section 31 of the new Blue Sky law, Mum. STAT. § 80A.31
(Supp. 1973), states that the Act shall be construed so as to effectuate
its general purposes to make uniform the laws of those states which enact
the Uniform Securities Act and to coordinate interpretation with the re-
lated federal regulation.
107. Subd. 2. Any person who violates section 80A.01 in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security shall be liable to
any person damaged thereby who sold such security to him or
to whom he sold such security, and any person who violates sec-
tion 80A.03 in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity shall be liable to any person damaged by the conduct pre-
scribed by section 80A.03. Any person who violates section
80A.02 in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
shall be liable to any investment advisory client of his who is
damaged thereby. Damages in an action pursuant to this subdi-
vision shall include the actual damages sustained plus interest
from the date of payment or sale, costs and reasonable attorney's
fees.
Subd. 3. Every person who directly or indirectly controls
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Whereas civil liability under Rule 10b-5 is a creature of the
courts, section 23 expressly delineates the civil liabilities which
result from violations of the Act. Subdivision 2 of that section
allows recovery by persons damaged ,by trading which violates
section 1, fraudulent advice which violates section 2, or market
rigging which violates section 3. Subdivision 3 of section 23 ex-
tends liability to persons controlling or aiding those liable under
subdivision 2. Subdivision 4 sets forth a defense to liability un-
der subdivisions 2 or 3, stating that no liability shall occur where
the person sued can "sustain the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the existence of facts by reason of which the liability
is alleged to exist."'0 8 The requirement that the trader "in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known" imposes the
negligence standard articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur but not
subsequently followed.10 9 Similarly, in holding liable those per-
sons who, by exercising reasonable care, could have known of
the facts giving rise to liability, subdivision 4 establishes a spe-
cific definition of scienter not found in federal law.
If Minnesota is to follow the trend of federal cases finding
tippees liable under Rule lOb-5,110 tippees would also be subject
to section 1 of the new Act. Since the provisions of section 23,
including the scienter requirement of section 23(4), would also
apply, tippees in Minnesota would be held liable if they were
to trade in violation of section 1.
Section 2 of the new Blue Sky law renders it unlawful for
a paid investment advisor "to employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud ... or ... to engage in any act, practice or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
a person liable under subdivision 1 or 2, every partner, principal
executive officer or director of such person, every person occu-
pying a similar status or performing a similar function, every
employee of such person who materially aids in the act or trans-
action constituting the violation, and every broker-dealer or
agent who materially aids in the act or transaction constituting
the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as such person. There is contribution as in cases
of contract among the several persons so liable.
Subd. 4. No person shall be liable under subdivisions 1 to
3 who shall sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
the existence of facts by reason of which the liability is alleged
to exist.
MnqN. STAT. § 80A.23 (Supp. 1973).
108. Id. § 80A.23(4).
109. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
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upon" a client."' Section 23 imposes liability for a client's dam-
ages upon any investment advisor who violates section 2, as well
as upon persons who control or aid such an investment advisor.
Since recovery for a violation of section 2 requires privity be-
tween the investment advisor and the client, friends of the client
who receive information from the client will 'be unable to recover
under section 2 if they are harmed by an advisor's fraud.
Section 3 makes it unlawful for any person to induce a pur-
chase or sale by means of fraudulent devices, including fictitious
quotations. 1 2 The section outlaws transactions which involve no
beneficial changes in ownership and are intended to create a false
or misleading appearance of active trading in the security. Fi-
nally, section 3 makes it illegal for one or more persons to use
either deceptive transactions or the resulting market rumors for
the purpose of raising or lowering the price of a security and
thereby inducing its purchase or sale.
111. It is unlawful for any person who receives any considera-
tion from another person primarily for advising the other person
as to the value of securities or their purchase or sale, whether
through the issuance of analyses or reports or otherwise:
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud the
other person; or(b) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the other
person.
Mrmr. STAT. § 80A.02(1) (Supp. 1973).
112. It is unlawful for any person to effect any transaction in,
or to induce the purchase or sale of any security by means of
any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or con-
trivance, including any fictitious quotation. The terms "manipu-
lative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance" shall
include, but shall not be limited to, the following practices:
(a) effecting any transaction in a security which involves
no change in the beneficial ownership thereof, or entering any
order or orders for the purchase or sale of any security with the
knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size,
at substantially the same time, and at substantially the same
price, for the sale or purchase of the security, have been or will
be entered by or for the same or affiliated persons, for the pur-
pose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trad-
ing in the security or a false or misleading appearance with re-
spect to the market for the security;(b) effecting, alone or with one or more other persons, a
series of transactions in any security creating actual or apparent
active trading in the security or raising or depressing the price
of the security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale
of the security by others; or(c) inducing the purchase or sale of any security by the cir-
culation or dissemination of information to the effect that the
price of the security will or is likely to rise or fall because of
market operations of any one or more persons conducted for the
purpose of raising or depressing the price of the security, if he
is selling or offering to sell or purchasing or offering to purchase
the security or is receiving a considirationr directly or indirgctly,
from any such person,
Id. & 80,03,
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The goal of section 3113 is to prevent the use of "market rig-
ging."' " 4 Market rigging occurs when brokers or customers trade
large volumes of stock among themselves at prearranged prices
and thereby create a false impression that an active market for
the security exists. This increased activity may induce an un-
wary victim to buy, ,believing that he can dispose of the stock
at any time. When the artificial trading stops, the victim discov-
ers either that there is no active market or that his attempts
to sell a large block of shares would depress the price of the
stock. Market rigging contributed to the 1929 crash" 5 and was
subsequently regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;1" however, the federal provision is limited to price manipu-
lation on the national securities exchanges. Section 3 extends
regulation to the large Minnesota over-the-counter market. Un-
der section 23, those who violate section 3 and those who control
or assist them face the same liability as those who violate sections
1 or 2.
The new Blue Sky law offers two advantages over previous
state regulation. The Act incorporates a large body of federal
law into Minnesota law and thereby reaches some previously un-
regulated problems, especially that of market rigging at the local
level. In addition, the new law contains both a specific scienter
requirement to clarify the point at which liability arises and
criminal sanctions to provide a remedy beyond civil liability
when a violation occurs." 7 However, since the new law appears
to be limited by the "buyer-seller" requirement of Birnbaum, de-
rivative actions are still left to the common law." s Thus it is
significant that the Act preserves the common law as an alterna-
tive to the statute. Section 23(11) provides that the "rights and
remedies promulgated by sections 80A.01 to 80A.31 are in addition
to any other right or remedy that may exist at law or in
113. As section 3 is substantially similar to section 9 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970), the history of the 1934 Actand comments on the
practices forbidden by the 1934 Act shed light on the actions section 3
is intended to prevent. See W. DOUGLAS, DEmocRACY AND FTNANCE (J.
Allen ed. 1940). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 2A E. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORaANizATTONs, THE FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §§ 5-300 to 399 (1973).
114. See 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. If 22,509.05 (manipulation of listed
security prices); 22,509.06 (wash sales involving no beneficial change
of ownership); 1 22,509.07 (matched orders).
115. E. GADSBY, supra note 113, at §§ 5-300 to 399.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
117. nI.N. STAT. § 80A.22 (Supp. 1973) provides for a fine of up to
$5000 or five years imprisonment or both for violating the act.
118, S€e potes 69-6 upra =pd accompanying text,
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equity."" 9 Since the statute does not preempt common law ac-
tions, the courts are free to grant relief for violations of the com-
mon law where they occur.
B. COmmON LAW
1. Liability of Insiders
A corporation may be able to recover damages where insiders
and tippees 'breach a fiduciary duty, even though the corporation
is unable to bring suit under the Minnesota statute. However,
it would be necessary for the Minnesota courts to recognize the
rationale of Diamond 20 and Schein'2 1 before such an action could
be brought by or on behalf of a corporation harmed by insider
trading. Specifically, state common law must impose upon that
insider a fiduciary duty to his corporation to refrain from trading
on inside information. Where the corporation is harmed by in-
sider trading, therefore, the court must: (1) recognize a general
fiduciary duty owed to the corporation by the insider, (2) find
that the duty specifically includes an obligation not to use the
inside information, and (3) hold that that liability to the corpora-
tion arises when the duty is breached.
Minnesota cases have long held that corporate officers and
directors are fiduciaries of the corporation and are responsible
to the corporation for any breach of that relationship. In 1911,
the supreme court recognized the general principle that the man-
ager of a corporation is a trustee for the shareholders and there-
fore must account for corporate profits and act in good faith
when dealing with the shareholders. 22 Other cases have allowed
actions where a director converted corporate business opportuni-
ties1 28 or assets,12 4 fraudulently increased his salary, or in some
other way mismanaged the corporation for his own benefit. 2 5
119. MINN. STAT. § 80A.23(11) (Supp. 1973).
120. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.
2d 78 (1969).
121. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
122. Eckberg v. Swedish Am. Publishing Co., 114 Minn. 196, 130 N.W.
1029 (1911).
123. Chicago Flexotile Floor Co. v. Lane, 188 Minn. 422, 247 N.W. 517
(1933).
124. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union, 259 Minn. 257,
107 N.W.2d 226 (1961); Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N.W. 861
(1912).
125. Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939);
Barrett v. Smith, 185 Minn. 596, 242 N.W. 392 (1932); Mower v. Staples,
32 Minn. 284, 20 N.W. 225 (1884); Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 16
N.W. 854 (1883).
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In Shearer v. Barnes,126 a case involving the conversion of corpo-
rate funds ,by the president of a trust company, the court identi-
fied the policy underlying such liability:
Corporate officers holding positions of trust... should be held
to strict accountability for any and all breaches of their trust
and disobedience of the law, and the law must be so adminis-
tered that they will never be allowed to profit by disobeying
it.127
In the early securities case of Shaw v. Straight,128 Shaw
brought a stockholder's derivative action to void the transfer of
corporate stock to Straight. In exchange for fishing locations
and tackle, the corporation had issued 28,000 shares of stock to
one KeIdall, who then sold the stock to Straight. Upon discover-
ing that there were no fishing locations, Shaw demanded that
the directors bring suit. The directors refused and Shaw brought
suit on behalf of the corporation, alleging that Straight knew
of the fraud when he purchased the stock. Shaw prevailed at
trial and the supreme court affirmed, holding that since Straight
had purchased the stock with knowledge of the fraud, he was
properly liable for the stock's return. Thus the court recognized
the right of a stockholder to bring a derivative action in a securi-
ties case based on fraud.
In McMenomy v. Ryden, 29 the court extended the rule of
Shaw to a derivative action based on breach of fiduciary duty.
The complaint alleged that the directors of an investment corpo-
ration had breached their duty to the corporation by personally
trading in securities in which the investment company was also
trading. It was further alleged that such trading compromised
the directors' choice and timing of investments, resulting in dam-
age to the corporation. Prior to the state court decision, a fed-
eral court had decided in favor of the defendants in an SEC ac-
tion under the Investment Company Act of 1940.130 However,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the federal decision was
not res judicata as to the corporation and that a derivative suit
for damages was proper. In so deciding, the court recognized
126. 118 Minn. 179, 136 N.W. 861 (1912).
127. Id. at 185, 136 N.W. at 865.
128. 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909).
129. 276 Minn. 55,148 N.W.2d 804 (1967).
130. The defendants were charged with "gross abuse of trust" and
"gross misconduct" for using the company for personal profit in violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1970). SEC v. Midwest Technical Dev. Corp.,
[1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,252 (D. Minn.
1963).
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a right of recovery analogous to that in Diamond'31 and held
that in Minnesota a fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation
by insiders, that this duty can be breached by using advance
knowledge of corporate action to effect securities transactions,
and that a breach results in liability to the corporation.
Although McMenomy might be distinguished from Diamond
on the grounds that the directors in McMenomy were trading
in stock other than that of their own corporation and that the
directors of an investment company owe a higher duty than di-
rectors of other companies to avoid use of inside information,
these distinctions disappear upon close examination. As to the
first ground, liability results not from the manner in which the
information is used but from the fact that the information is used
at all. Thus the nature of the use to which the information is
put is irrelevant; it is the breach of duty which renders the in-
sider liable. The second ground is similarly insignificant since
there is no justification for developing a hierarchy of insider duty
based on a distinction between different types of corporations.
McMenomy, therefore, is sufficiently similar to Diamond to pro-
vide a clear basis of recovery under Minnesota common law for
corporations injured by insider trading.
This liability is not restricted to insiders who are actively
trading, but extends to directors who know of a ,breach of duty
and acquiesce in the wrongful diversion of corporate assets. In
Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan,13 2 for example, a director who
knew that other directors had misappropriated funds was held
liable to the corporation for failing to take action to recover the
funds. The court found that his lack of diligence in bringing
the misappropriation to the attention of the board of directors
constituted a breach of duty on his part.
Similarly, partners or joint venturers may not make secret
profits by taking advantage of one another. In Dutton v.
Barnes,33 the president of a corporation purported to act on be-
half of the plaintiffs in the sale of their stock with his own.
When it was discovered that the president had secretly made
profits of $40,000 in selling the stock, the plaintiffs brought suit
claiming that a proportionate share of the $40,000 belonged to
them as part of the sale price of their shares. In affirming a
131. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
132. 42 Minn. 196, 44 N.W. 56 (1889).
133. 162Minn.430,203N.W.414 (1925).
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judgment of liability, the supreme court found that the president
had breached his fiduciary duty to the other shareholders when
he failed to disclose his secret profit from the transaction. In
so deciding, the court held that joint venturers owe to each other
a fiduciary duty to act in good faith, and that a breach of that
duty results in liability. 34
The broad right to recover against insiders is not without
limitation. A failure of proof prevents recovery-either proof
as to the use of the information'3 5 or proof that a fiduciary duty
is owed.1 30 Furthermore, Minnesota has adopted the rule that di-
rectors generally owe a fiduciary duty only to the corporation
and not to shareholders or other individuals, thus preventing in-
dividual actions by shareholders for damage to the value of their
stock when directors harm the corporation. For example, in
Seitz v. Michel, 37 a shareholder alleged that a certain director
was wasting corporate assets and sought personal recovery for
the damage to the value of his stock. The court affirmed a judg-
ment on the pleadings for the director, holding that although
a minority shareholder may bring suit for harm to the corpora-
tion, he can sue only in a derivative capacity for the harm to
the corporation and not for the damage to him individually. 3 8
In a related case,139 the court further limited individual recovery
by holding that a director does not owe a duty of disclosure when
purchasing stock from shareholders. A director had paid $125
per share for stock later alleged to be worth $155 to $330. The
selling stockholder contended that the director had offered to
purchase his stock and had fraudulently misrepresented the
value of the shares. The supreme court affirmed a jury verdict
for the director, holding that although a director owes a general
fiduciary duty to the corporation and possibly to the stockhold-
ers, no fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller imposes
an affirmative duty of disclosure. In so holding, the court fol-
lowed the then majority rule allowing transactions between di-
rectors and stockholders without disclosure.
134. A similar argument was made in Diamond, but because of fac-
tual differences the other directors in Diamond were not found liable.
135. Williams v. Davis, 182 Minn. 186, 234 N.W. 11 (1930) (no show-
ing of conversion of asset).
136. Northern Oil & Gas Co. v. Birkeland, 164 Minn. 466, 206 N.W.
380 (1925) (no showing that defendant had assumed a fiduciary posi-
tion).
137. 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921).
138. Id. at 87, 181 N.W. at 105.
139. Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922).
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2. Liability of Tippees
Minnesota common law liability also extends to those persons
who aid fiduciaries in breaching their duty to the corporation.
As illustrated 'by Schein v. Chasen, 40 this liability is predicated
upon the use of information obtained from a fiduciary with the
knowledge that the fiduciary has thereby breached his duty to
the corporation. Although no Minnesota case is directly in point,
analogous cases support the position that those persons who en-
gage in a "common enterprise," as in Schein, will be liable to
the corporation.
In Rothwell v. Robinson,'4 a shareholder alleged that an in-
sider of the corporation, aided by others, was diverting corporate
funds into worthless inventions. The trial court overruled a de-
murrer to the complaint and the supreme court affirmed, holding
that where it is alleged that the corporation has suffered a loss
because of the diversion of assets by an insider, all persons assist-
ing in the diversion are liable. Although the case was later de-
cided against the complaining shareholder on the evidence, the
supreme court affirmed the lower court's statement of the law,
'by which the defendant would have been held liable had the alle-
gations been proved.'4 2 From Rothwell it can be inferred that
the court would hold third parties liable to the corporation when
they aid another in a breach of a fiduciary duty.
Third parties are also liable to the corporation when they
engage in a joint enterprise with a corporate director to defraud
the corporation. In National Power & Paper Co. v. Rossman,143
the corporation brought suit against Rossman, a director, and
MacAlpine, an outsider, alleging fraud in the purchase of timber
and land by the corporation. After discovering that Rossman
and MacAlpine had conspired to sell the property to the corpora-
tion at prices far in excess of actual value, the corporation sought
to void the stock issued to MacAlpine in exchange for the assets
and to prevent him from voting it at stockholder meetings. Be-
fore the stock could be voided, a meeting was held at which Mac-
Alpine himself became a director. At a subsequent board of di-
rectors meeting Rossman resigned as a director, but a resolution
was passed directing dismissal of the suit against Rossman and
140. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.), vacated rn other grounds sub noam. Leh-
man Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
141. 39 Minn. 1, 38 N.W. 772 (1888).
142. Rothwell v. Robinson, 44 Minn. 538, 47 N.W. 255 (1890).
143. 122 Minn. 355,142 N.W. 818 (1913).
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MacAlpine. Upon learning of this, the stockholders sought to
intervene.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's intervention or-
der, preventing Rossman, no longer a director, from colluding
with the corporation to defraud the stockholders by dismissing
the suit. The court allowed the suit to proceed against both de-
fendants, even though MacAlpine had been an outsider at the
time of the fraud. Although the appeal raised only the issue
of intervention, the court assumed that a conspiracy to defraud
the corporation would have resulted in liability for the conspira-
tors.
This principle was partially affirmed in Risvold v. Gustaf-
son.144 In that case, a derivative action was brought to recover
profits secretly obtained through the purchase of a mine by the
corporation. Dahl, a miner, had sold a two-thirds interest to the
Cleary Hill Mines Company, supposedly retaining the other one-
third for himself. It was later revealed that certain directors
and stockholders had been induced to effect the transaction by
Dahl's promise of portions of his retained one-third interest, and
that interests in Dahl's one-third had in fact been given to five
directors and two other individuals, Thurston and Gustafson.145
The action was brought on a conspiracy theory, with the corpora-
tion participating as a plaintiff. Before trial, two of the directors
turned over to the corporation the stock received from Dahl. At
trial, the remaining three directors and Gustafson were held
liable to the corporation, but Dahl and Thurston were exoner-
ated.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. After
stating the rule for conspiracy liability, 46 the court held that
since Dahl, unlike the directors, had made no secret profit, he
was not liable. The court also held that Thurston's stock was
in fact a gift from Dahl, and that since Thurston owed the corpo-
ration no fiduciary duty, he was under no obligation to return the
stock to the corporation. Similarly, Gustafson was not liable for
the shares given him -by Dahl, but was liable for shares given
him by other directors, who had received them from Dahl. The
court stated that the corporation was entitled to recover that for
144. 207 Minn. 359, 292 N.W. 103 (1940).
145. Dahl had incorporated his interest under the laws of Alaska and
had given stock in the corporation to the seven individuals.
146. "A third person who has colluded with a fiduciary in commit-
ting a breach of duty, and who obtained a benefit therefrom, is under
a duty of restitution to the beneficiary." 207 Minn. at 365, 292 N.W. at
106-07, citing REusTATErmNT o RESTITUTON § 138(2) (1937).
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
which it had paid-the two-thirds interest on the face of the con-
tract and the shares given the directors by Dahl to complete the
purchase-but was not entitled to the shares received by nonfidu-
ciaries. On a second appeal, the court reaffirmed Gustafson's lia-
bility, observing that he had "without value and with knowledge
of the facts . . shared in the 'rake-off' improperly taken.1147
Risvold provides contradictory authority as to whether tip-
pees will be held liable to the corporation for breach of fiduciary
duty. If those colluding with directors are to be liable, Dahl
should have been liable. On the other hand, the court's empha-
sis on Dahl's lack of personal profit from the transaction implies
that if he had profited, he would have been liable. Furthermore,
by holding Gustafson liable, the court indicates that those per-
sons sharing in ill-gotten gains will be liable for those gains. By
this reasoning, if Dahl had received an unjust price for the prop-
erty sold to the corporation, he would have been liable for the
amount of the excess profit. A court passing upon the question
of tippee liability may therefore rely upon Risvold as authority
for the dismissal of actions against those persons who do not
profit from the transaction. However, since the imposition of
liability upon those persons who collude with insiders deters such
collusion, there is a strong policy argument against such a result.
Also, the reasoning of the Schein court-that all persons who
aid in the breach of duty should be held liable-might persuade
a Minnesota court to expand Risvold.
Thus the basis for finding common-law liability for all per-
sons trading on inside information clearly exists in Minnesota.
An examination of cases involving corporate fiduciaries reveals
that in Minnesota (1) corporate officers and employees owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation, (2) the duty is breached by
the use of inside information, and (3) a breach results in liability
to the corporation. Therefore, when a case similar to Diamond
v. Oreamuno arises in Minnesota, the court can rely upon a
lengthy history of decisions which support liability. Such a case
would probably be decided upon the same principles as Mc-
Menomy-that the use of inside information to trade in corporate
stock is a violation of a fiduciary duty.
The liability of tippees can also rest upon existing Minnesota
common law, although such law is not as clear as the law sup-
porting the liability of officers and directors. Under the inter-
147. Risvold v. Gustafson, 209 Minn. 357, 358, 296 N.W. 411, 412
(1941).
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pretation of the Restatement (Second) of Agency set forth in
Schein v. Chasen, liability would exist where, first, a tippee ei-
ther intentionally causes an agent to breach his duty, or assists
in the breach, or with notice of the breach receives information
from the agent; and second, the tippee either discloses the infor-
mation to others or uses it himself for profit. In light of National
Power and Rothwell, it is clear that the Minnesota Supreme
Court would find liable to the corporation those tippees who are
engaged in a "common enterprise" to use inside information.
Should the Minnesota courts adopt the Restatement rule and the
rationale of Schein, this liability would extend to tippees who
know of the breach of duty but nevertheless use the information.
Just as McMenomy is analogous to Diamond in establishing the
liability of insiders at common law in Minnesota, Rothwell and
National Power are sufficiently analogous to Schein to establish
the liability of persons who collude with insiders to breach a fidu-
ciary duty.
IV. CONCLUSION
There exists a growing body of state statutory and common
law which allows recovery 'by persons harmed by insider and
tippee trading. The adoption of the Uniform Securities Act in
several states and decisions such as Diamond and Schein provide
the basis of this growing state regulation. An examination of
Minnesota law reveals that Minnesota is following this trend,
most recently with the adoption of a new Blue Sky statute based
on the Uniform Securities Act. Furthermore, Minnesota com-
mon law supports a finding of liability on the part of insiders
and tippees when they use inside information to trade corporate
stock in breach of a fiduciary duty.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Minnesota law leaves unan-
swered several questions raised in Diamond and Schein. Issues
still to be resolved are the extent of damages to be awarded148
148. At common law, a plaintiff can bring an action either for recis-
sion of the transaction or for damages. If recission is granted, the stock
traded, plus any income such as dividends earned on the stock, would
be returned in exchange for the consideration paid. If damages are
sought, they are measured as the price paid or received less what would
have been paid or received if disclosure had been made, which is gener-
ally the average price on the day following disclosure, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), or the value of the shares
at the time of the discovery of the fraud, Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94
(10th Cir. 1969). Under the new Blue Sky law, damages are limited to
actual damages sustained, plus interest from the date of sale, costs, and
attorneys' fep. Mnw, STAT. § 8QA.$3(2) (Supp. 1973). A problem of
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and the limits of tippee liability under either a conspiracy theory
or section 1 of the statute.149 When faced with these ques-
tions, the court should return to the basic policy underlying the
concepts of fiduciary duty and tippee liability-that neither the
agents of the corporation nor their tippees should be allowed to
profit by harming the corporation, and that equality of informa-
tion among investors should be promoted by discouraging the
selective use of nonpublic information.
'"multiple recovery" results where both derivative actions and fraud,
Rule lOb-5, or section 1 suits are brought against insiders or tippees. The
courts generally hold that insiders should be liable only for the amount
of their profits, with that amount split between those defrauded and the
corporation. However, it can be argued that insiders should be liable
both for the full amount of damages to investors and for damages to the
corporation, even if the total amount exceeds the profit made by the in-
siders, since separate wrongs are committed against each.
149. The "extent" of liability turns on the definitions of "materiality"
and "inside information." If those terms are defined to mean that infor-
mation is material or inside only if it comes from a corporate source,
then liability is limited to those receiving information from corporate
sources or having reason to believe the information has originated from
a corporate source. However, if those terms include all nonpublic infor-
mation regardless of corporate "access" or source, then the scope of lia-
bility is broadened beyond those persons with corporate sources and al-
lows recovery by virtually anyone who does not receive disclosure of in-
formation which would influence a trading decision. For a discussion
of the various viewpoints see BROMBERG, supra note 2, at § 7.5(6); 6 L.
Loss, SECUeniS REGuLATION 3563-68 (1969); PAiNEs, supra note 1, at
15-16.
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